Refuting The Florentine Axiom
In this article I will be refuting the idea that relative opposition is necessary for a real distinction between the persons of the Trinity.
INTRODUCTION:
”First, then, the holy Roman church, founded on the words of our Lord and Saviour, firmly believes, professes and preaches one true God, almighty, immutable and eternal, Father, Son and holy Spirit; one in essence, three in persons; unbegotten Father, Son begotten from the Father, holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son; the Father is not the Son or the holy Spirit, the Son is not the Father or the holy Spirit, the holy Spirit is not the Father or the Son; the Father is only the Father, the Son is only the Son, the holy Spirit is only the holy Spirit. The Father alone from his substance begot the Son; the Son alone is begotten of the Father alone; the holy Spirit alone proceeds at once from the Father and the Son. These three persons are one God not three gods, because there is one substance of the three, one essence, one nature, one Godhead, one immensity, one eternity, and everything is one where the opposition of a relation does not prevent this.”
- Council of Basel-Ferrara-Florence, 1431-49 A.D.
The one of the most well-known argument made at Florence was that for the Spirit and the Son to be really distinguished there would have to be relative opposition between the Son and the Spirit. In fact it was even argued by Thomas Aquinas himself in his Commentary on the Sentences, and in his Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars. Let’s first examine his arguments.
However, in the divine, a difference of reality is only through the opposition of relation (oppositionem relationis).
- Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences I, Distinction 27, Question 1, Article 1 .
”I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (I:28:3; I:30:2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above (I:28:44). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a "principle," and of what is "from the principle." Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.”
- Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, q. 36 Art. 2
Even Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange the 20th-century Dominican theologian makes this argument.
“Just as in God there is not a triple intelligence nor a triple will, so all the more there is no triple being, for in God all things are one and the same except where there is the opposition of relation.”
- Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, ‘The Trinity and God the Creator’, 67-68
REFUTATION:
How does one go about making a refutation of this axiom?
Let me first make the argument then present the quotations from where the argument has its origins.
The Florentine axiom is that for things to really differ there needs to be a relation of opposition but this argument will show that this presupposition is false.
There is a relative opposition between two things if and only if each thing has a reference towards the other. Two things have a reference towards the other only if they are the formal terminus of each other. Hence, if there is a relative opposition between two things, then each thing must be the formal terminus of the other. If, for the sake of argument, there is a relative opposition between paternity and passive spiration, then paternity is the formal terminus of passive spiration and vice versa. But they are not the formal terminus of each other. Therefore, there is not relative opposition between paternity and passive spiration. Moreover, passive spiration and paternity are not entitatively identical. In consequence, there exist, in God, a real distinction between two things that are not relatively opposed.
Paternity is not the formal terminus of passive spiration but of filiation and passive spiration is not the formal terminus of paternity but of active spiration. We can conclude from this that although paternity and passive spiration are really distinct they are not relatively opposed.
This refutation originates from Bartholomew Mastrius the 17th-century Italian Franciscan Scotist.
“Granada, as mentioned by Ariaga in dispute 63, number 33 , answers that paternity and filiation demand active spiration as an entirely intrinsic predicate, and therefore filiation, including such, is distinguished from passive spiration. This solution is not satisfactory because; firstly, if by the term 'intrinsic predicate' he means that paternity and filiation include active spiration in their definitive quiddity, then Paterntas (paternity) is as the Father is the Father, not as he is a spirator, and the Father as the father refers to the Son, not to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, active spiration is not included in the formal account of paternity, as such, nor of filiation, for the same reason. Alternatively, if by inclusion he means real identity, this does not help our case, because paternity also includes essence, as an intrinsic predicate through real identity, and yet it is not communicated to the three, as is the essence; nor is essence found in only one, as paternity is, even though it is identified with it. Therefore, either paternity is not distinct from passive spiration for that reason, or even essence is also distinct.”
- Bartolomeo Mastrii, De Sanctissima Trinitate, Quaestio Quarta
Syllogistic Argument:
Definitions: ‘ x =ₑₙₜ y ’≔ x is entitatively identical with y ‘Txy’ ≔ x is the formal terminus of y ‘Oxy’ ≔ there is a relative opposition between x and y ‘Rxy’ ≔ x has a reference towards y ‘a’ and ‘b’ stand for arbitrary individuals ‘s’ ≔ passive spiration ‘p’ ≔ paternity
Summary: There exist four relations present in God. In suffice enumeration, we find i) paternity, ii) filiation, iii) active spiration, and iv) passive spiration. These divine relations arise in regards to origin, according to which one divine person proceeds from another. And of these four, three of the relations of origin are really distinct from one another—paternity, filiation, and passive spiration. Here, I will consider the real distinction between paternity and passive spiration; that it is not the case that passive spiration is entitatively identical with paternity (P1).
Relative opposition is the repugnance, the repulsion, between things which mutually relate or refer to each other; for instance, between double and half; between father and son. To say this more rigorously: for all x and for all y, there is a relative opposition between x and y if and only if x has a reference towards y and y has a reference towards x (P3). The last portion of the quasi-Lₚ, the mixture between english and Lₚ (predicate logic), capture the mutual referential nature the things have towards one another. This reciprocal orientation can only be understood as both things attain the other as their respective term; it represents the pure ordering or reference towards a term. To put it more bluntly: for all x and for all y, x has a reference towards y and y has a reference towards x only if y is the formal terminus of x and x is the formal terminus of y (P4).
To revisit and expand upon our previous discussion, I will add that paternity has as its correlative, that is, terminus, to none but a son. In a similar fashion, passive spiration has as its term to none but a spirator. Let it be noted that the inclusion of ‘none but’, as used in the previous sentences, does not exclude that by which the things (the son and spirator) are related to the other, i.e., the relations of filiation and active spiration, respectively. Hence, it is not the case that paternity is the formal terminus of passive spiration and passive spiration is the formal terminus of paternity, for paternity is not a spirator nor the relation of a spirator to the spirated, and passive spiration is not a son nor the relation of a son to a father. To rephrase as previously expressed: it is simply not the case that paternity is the formal terminus of passive spiration and passive spiration is the formal terminus of paternity (P2).
All the statements I have made above serve as the premises for the argument. The conclusion to be derived is that there exists, in the divine, a real distinction without relative opposition. And, if you haven’t already realized, this argument will be structured on the real distinction between passive spiration and paternity. I symbolize what I intend to arrive at deductively as follows: there is at least one x and there is at least one y such that it is not the case that there is a relative opposition between x and y and it is not the case that x is entitatively identical with y (P5).
I first use the transformation rule of biconditional equivalence on what was said earlier about relative opposition to yield the following: for all x and for all y, if there is an relative opposition between x and y then x has a reference towards y and y has a reference towards x and for all x and for all y, if x has a reference towards y and y has a reference towards x then there is an opposition of relation between x and y (P6). I have no need of the second conditional statement, and thus use the inference rule of conjunction elimination to remove it, and I am left with: for all x and for all y, if there is a relative opposition between x and y then x has a reference towards y and y has a reference towards x (P7).
To start our conditional proof, let us suppose two arbitrary individuals a and b, to which there is a relative opposition between them (P8). I aim to infer that b is the formal terminus of a and a is the formal terminus of b given the suppositional premise, which is the sentence directly antecedent to this (P9). Using universal instantiation, I deduce that: if there is a relative opposition between a and b then a has a reference towards b and b has a reference towards a (P10). I infer that a has a reference towards b and b has a reference towards a, in consideration of the suppositional premise and the universal instantiation, through modus ponens (P11). I tediously instantiate another universally quantified sentence: if a has a reference towards b and b has a reference towards a, then b is the formal terminus of a and a is the formal terminus of b (P12). I again use modus ponens, inferring b is the formal terminus of a and a is the formal terminus of b from the two (P13). I discharge the supposition, and conclude that: if there is a relative opposition between a and b then b is the formal terminus of a and a is the formal terminus of b, via conditional proof (P14).
From what I have accumulated from the conditional proof, I make a universal generalization: for all x and for all y, if there is a relative opposition between x and y then y is the formal terminus of x and x is the formal terminus of y (P15). I begin another proof, this time indirect. As my suppositional premise, let is be that: there is a relative opposition between passive spiration and paternity (P16). What we wish to derive from this is any sentence in conjunction with its negation (P17). I instantiated the universally quantified sentence which we had got from the generalization: if there is a relative opposition between passive spiration and paternity, then paternity is the formal terminus of passive spiration and passive spiration is the formal terminus of paternity (P18). Following modeus ponens, we infer that paternity is the formal terminus of passive spiration and passive spiration is the formal terminus of paternity (P19). This in conjunction with was we had asserted in our premises, we arrive at: paternity is the formal terminus of passive spiration and passive spiration is the formal terminus of paternity and it is not the case that paternity is the formal terminus of passive spiration and passive spiration is the formal terminus of paternity (P20).
I discharge the indirect proof and infer that it is not the case that there is a relative opposition between passive spiration and paternity (P21), as it leads to a contradiction. I put this in conjunction with their lack of real identity: it is not the case that there is a relative opposition between passive spiration and paternity and it is not the case that passive spiration is entitatively identical with paternity (P22). And lastly, following an existential generalization, we arrive at the conclusion: there is at least one x and there is at least y such that it is not the case that there is a relative opposition between x and y and it is not the case that x is entitatively identical with y (P23).
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